This is admitted when it is an enemy who is tried, as in the Nuremberg Trials. It was widely admitted that the Nuremberg prisoners would not have been condemned if they had been tried by Germans. The enemies of the German Government would have punished with death any soldier among themselves who had practised the sort of civil disobedience the lack of which among Germans they pleaded as an excuse for condemning Germans. They refused to accept the plea made by many of those whom they condemned that they had committed criminal acts only under command of those in superior authority. The judges of Nuremberg believed that the Germans should have committed civil disobedience in the name of decency and humanity. This is little likely to have been their view if they had been judging their own countrymen and not their enemies . But I believe it is true of friend as well as foe. The line between proper acceptable civil disobedience and inacceptable civil disobedience comes, I believe, with the reason for it being committed – the seriousness of the object for which it is committed and the profundity of the belief in its necessity. * inacceptable = unacceptable http://ejje.weblio.jp/content/inacceptable 出典：[From: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.3 chap. 1: Return to England, 1969] 詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB31-160.HTM
I thought the Russian blockade was foolish and was glad that it was unsuccessful owing to the skill of the British. At this time I was persona grata with the British Government because, though I was against nuclear war, I was also anti-Communist. Later I was brought around to being more favourable to Communism by the death of Stalin in 1953 and by the Bikini test in 1954; and I came gradually to attribute, more and more, the danger of nuclear war to the West, to the United States of America, and less to Russia. This change was supported by developments inside the United States, such as McCarthyism and the restriction of civil liberties. I was doing a great deal of broadcasting for the various services of the BBC and they asked me to do one at the time of Stalin’s death. As I rejoiced mightily in that event, since I felt Stalin to be as wicked as one man could be and to be the root evil of most of the misery and terror in, and threatened by, Russia, I condemned him in my broadcast and rejoiced for the world in his departure from the scene. I forgot the BBC susceptibilities and respectabilities. My broadcast never went on the air.
出典: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.3 chap. 1: Return to England, 1969]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB31-080.HTM
I had known Berlin well in the old days, and the hideous destruction that I saw at this time shocked me. From my window I could barely see one house standing. I could not discover where the Germans were living. This complete destruction was due partly to the English and partly to the Russians, and it seemed to me monstrous. Contemplation of the less accountable razing of Dresden by my own countrymen sickened me. I felt that when the Germans were obviously about to surrender that was enough, and that to destroy not only 135,000 Germans but also all their houses and countless treasures was barbarous. I felt the treatment of Germany by the Allies to be almost incredibly foolish.By giving part of Germany to Russia and part to the West, the victorious Governments ensured the continuation of strife between East and West, particularly as Berlin was partitioned and there was no guarantee of access by the West to its part of Berlin except by air. They had imagined a peaceful co-operation between Russia and her Western allies, but they ought to have foreseen that this was not a likely outcome. As far as sentiment was concerned, what happened was a continuation of the war with Russia as the common enemy of the West. The stage was set for the Third World War, and this was done deliberately by the utter folly of Governments.
出典: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.3 chap. 1: Return to England, 1969]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB31-070.HTM
None the less, at the time I gave this advice, I gave it so casually without any real hope that it would be followed, that I soon forgot I had given it. I had mentioned it in a private letter and again in a speech that I did not know was to be the subject of dissection by the press. When, later, the recipient of the letter asked me for permission to publish it, I said, as I usually do, without consideration of the contents, that if he wished he might publish it. He did so. And to my surprise I learned of my earlier suggestion. I had, also, entirely forgotten that it occurred in the above-mentioned speech. Unfortunately, in the meantime, before this incontrovertible evidence was set before me, I had hotly denied that I had ever made such a suggestion. It was a pity. It is shameful to deny one’s own words. One can only defend or retract them. In this case I could, and did, defend them, and should have done so earlier but from a fault of my memory upon which from many years’ experience I had come to rely too unquestioningly.
発言: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.3 chap. 1: Return to England, 1969]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB31-050.HTM
Against this careless attitude I, like a few others, used every opportunity that presented itself to point out the dangers. It seemed to me then, as it still seems to me, that the time to plan and to act in order to stave off approaching dangers is when they are first seen to be approaching. Once their progress is established, it is very much more difficult to halt it. I felt hopeful, therefore, when the Baruch Proposal was made by the United States to Russia. I thought better of it then, and of the American motives in making it, than I have since learned to think, but I still wish that the Russians had accepted it. However, the Russians did not. They exploded their first bomb in August, 1949, and it was evident that they would do all in their power to make themselves the equals of the United States in destructive – or, politely, defensive – power. The arms race became inevitable unless drastic measures were taken to avoid it. That is why, in late 1948, I suggested that the remedy might be the threat of immediate war by the United States on Russia for the purpose of forcing nuclear disarmament upon her. I have given my reasons for doing this in an Appendix to my Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. My chief defence of the view I held in 1948 was that I thought Russia very likely to yield to the demands of the West. This ceased to be probable after Russia had a considerable fleet of nuclear planes.
This advice of mine is still brought up against me. It is easy to understand why Communists might object to it. But the usual criticism is that I, a pacifist, once advocated the threat of war. It seems to cut no ice that I have reiterated ad nauseum that I am not a pacifist, that I believe that some wars, a very few, are justified, even necessary. They are usually necessary because matters have been permitted to drag on their obviously evil way till no peaceful means can stop them. Nor do my critics appear to consider the evils that have developed as a result of the continued Cold War and that might have been avoided, along with the Cold War itself, had my advice to threaten war been taken in 1948. Had it been taken, the results remain hypothetical, but so far as I can see it is no disgrace, and shows no ‘inconsistency’ in my thought, to have given it.
出典: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.3 chap. 1: Return to England, 1969]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB31-040.HTM
1940年代と1950年代の初期を通して,私の精神状態は,核の問題に関して混乱と動揺の状態にあった。私にとって,核戦争が起これば,人類の文明に終焉をもたらすだろうということは明らかだと思われた。もし東西の両陣営に政策の変化がなければ,遅かれ早かれ核戦争は確実に起こるということもまた明らかだと思われた。そうした危険(の認識)は,実は1920年代の初期から私の頭の片隅にあった（松下注：ラッセルは The ABC of Atoms, 1925 及び The ABC of Relativity, 1925 の著者であることに注意）。しかし,当時は,少数の学識のある物理学者たちは来るべき危険についての鑑識眼を持っていたが,大多数の人々は －街頭の人々だけでなく科学者たちでさえも－「人間はそれほど馬鹿ではないだろう」などと気楽に言いながら,原子力戦争（核戦争）の見通しから目をそらしてきた。 1945年の広島と長崎への原爆投下は,初めて科学者と少数の政治家たちの注意を核戦争の可能性に向けさせた。日本のこの２つの都市への原爆投下の２，３ケ月後に,私は,英国国会の上院で演説をし,全面的核戦争が起こる可能性があること,そしてもし核戦争が起これば,全世界に惨事をもたらすことはまちがいないこと,を指摘した（松下注：1945年11月28日に演説）。私は,広島と長崎に投下された原爆よりもはるかに強力な核爆弾,すなわち従来の原子核分裂方式ではなく核融合方式の爆弾,つまり事実上現在の水素爆弾が製造されることを予言し,説明した。あの当時であったら,私が恐れていた軍拡競争はまだ始まっていなかったので,このような怪物を,戦争目的にではなく平和目的のために使用するようある種の統制を強いることもできた。・・・。
Throughout the forties and the early fifties, my mind was in a state of confused agitation on the nuclear question. It was obvious to me that a nuclear war would put an end to civilisation. It was also obvious that unless there were a change of policies in both East and West a nuclear war was sure to occur sooner or later. The dangers were in the back of my mind from the early ‘twenties. But in those days, although a few learned physicists were appreciative of the coming danger, the majority, not only of men in the streets, but even of scientists, turned aside from the prospect of atomic war with a kind of easy remark that ‘Oh, men will never be so foolish as that’. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 first brought the possibility of nuclear war to the attention of men of science and even of some few politicians. A few months after the bombing of the two Japanese cities, I made a speech in the House of Lords pointing out the likelihood of a general nuclear war and the certainty of its causing universal disaster if it occurred. I forecast and explained the making of nuclear bombs of far greater power than those used upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, fusion as against the old fission bombs, the present hydrogen bombs in fact. It was possible at that time to enforce some form of control of these monsters to provide for their use for peaceful, not war like, ends, since the arms race which I dreaded had not yet begun.
出典: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.3 chap. 1: Return to England, 1969]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB31-030.HTM
I do not wish to exaggerate. The gradual change in my views, from 1932 to 1940, was not a revolution; it was only a quantitative change and a shift of emphasis. I had never held the non-resistance creed absolutely, and I did not now reject it absolutely. But the practical difference, between opposing the First War and supporting the Second, was so great as to mask the considerable degree of theoretical consistency that in fact existed.
Although my reason was wholly convinced, my emotions followed with reluctance. My whole nature had been involved in my opposition to the First War, whereas it was a divided self that favoured the Second. I have never since 1940 recovered the same degree of unity between opinion and emotion as I had possessed from 1914 to 1918. I think that, in permitting myself that unity, I had allowed myself more of a creed than scientific intelligence can justify. To follow scientific intelligence wherever it may lead me had always seemed to me the most imperative of moral precepts for me, and I have followed this precept even when it has involved a loss of what I myself had taken for deep spiritual insight.
出典: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.2 chap. 5: Later Years of Telegraph House, 1968]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB25-040.HTM
This attitude, however, had become unconsciously insincere. I had been able to view with reluctant acquiescence the possibility of the supremacy of the Kaiser’s Germany; I thought that, although this would be an evil, it would not be so great an evil as a world war and its aftermath. But Hitler’s Germany was a different matter. I found the Nazis utterly revolting – cruel, bigoted, and stupid. Morally and intellectually they were alike odious to me. Although I clung to my pacifist convictions, I did so with increasing difficulty. When, in 1940, England was threatened with invasion, I realized that, throughout the First War, I had never seriously envisaged the possibility of utter defeat. I found this possibility unbearable, and at last consciously and definitely decided that I must support what was necessary for victory in the Second War, however difficult victory might be to achieve, and however painful in its consequences.
This was the last stage in the slow abandonment of many of the beliefs that had come to me in the moment of ‘conversion’ in 1901. I had never been a complete adherent of the doctrine of non-resistance; I had always recognized the necessity of the police and the criminal law, and even during the First War I had maintained publicly that some wars are justifiable. But I had allowed a larger sphere to the method of non-resistance or, rather, non-violent resistance than later experience seemed to warrant. It certainly has an important sphere; as against the British in India, Gandhi led it to triumph. But it depends upon the existence of certain virtues in those against whom it is employed. When Indians lay down on railways, and challenged the authorities to crush them under trains, the British found such cruelty intolerable. But the Nazis had no scruples in analogous situations.The doctrine which Tolstoy preached with great persuasive force, that the holders of power could be morally regenerated if met by non-resistance, was obviously untrue in Germany after 1933. Clearly Tolstoy was right only when the holders of power were not ruthless beyond a point, and clearly the Nazis went beyond this point.
[From: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.2 chap. 5: Later Years of Telegraph House, 1968]
http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB25-030.HTM
The War of 1914-18 changed everything for me. I ceased to be academic and took to writing a new kind of books. I changed my whole conception of human nature. I became for the first time deeply convinced that Puritanism does not make for human happiness. Through the spectacle of death I acquired a new love for what is living. I became convinced that most human beings are possessed by a profound unhappiness venting itself in destructive rages, and that only through the diffusion of instinctive joy can a good world be brought into being. I saw that reformers and reactionaries alike in our present world have become distorted by cruelties. I grew suspicious of all purposes demanding stern discipline. Being in opposition to the whole purpose of the community, and finding all the everyday virtues used as means for the slaughter of Germans, I experienced great difficulty in not becoming a complete Antinomian. But I was saved from this by the profound compassion which I felt for the sorrows of the world.
出典: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.2 chap. 1:The First War, 1968]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB21-330.HTM
[寸言}
1916年に,Justice in War Time と The Principles of Social Reconstruction を出版。それ以前は,哲学の入門書 The Problems of Philosophy, 1912 以外,一般の人が興味を持ちそうな popular books は書いていなかった。
この頃には,私と英国政府との関係は,非常に悪化していた。1916年に,私は,良心条項（注：良心的兵役拒否を認める条項)があるにも拘わらず,禁固刑の判決を受けたある良心的兵役拒否者に関するリーフレット（ラッセル注：その全文は『ラッセル自伝』pp.76-78に載っている) －このリーフレットは徴兵反対協会によって出版された。－ を 執筆した。そのリーフレットは私の名前を載せないで発行された。そうしてそのリーフレットを配布した人たちが投獄されたことを知り,非常に驚いた。それゆえ私は,『タイムズ』紙に,そのリーフレットの著者は自分であると書いて送った。私は,ロンドン市長（注：大ロンドンの首長ではなく,City of London の市長）公邸で,市長の前で起訴され,私は自分の弁護のため,長い演説を行なった。この時私は,百ポンドの罰金刑が科された 私はその金額を支払らわなかった。そのために,その罰金額を満たす額になるまで,ケンブリッジ大学（の自分の居室）にある私の持ち物が売られた。けれども,親切な友人たちがそれを買い戻し,私に返してくれたので,私の抵抗もやや無駄になってしまったと感じた。とかくするうちにトリニティ・コレッジでは,若いフェロー（特別研究員）たちは全員,将校任命の辞令をもらい,また年配のフェローたちも,当然のこととして,その責務を果たすことを望んだ。彼ら（年配のフェローたち）は,私から講師の職を奪いとった。
第一次世界大戦が終わり,若い人たち（＝若いフェローたち）がトリニティ・コレッジに戻ってくると,コレッジに復帰するよう要請されたが,この頃には,もう私には戻りたいという願望はまったくなくなっていた。
By this time my relations with the Government had became very bad. In 1916, I wrote a leaflet which was published by The No Conscription Fellowshipabout a conscientious objector who had been sentenced to imprisonment in defiance of the conscience clause. The leaflet appeared without my name on it, and I found rather to my surprise, that those who distributed it were sent to prison. I therefore wrote to The Times to state that I was the author of it. I was prosecuted in the Mansion House before the Lord Mayor, and made a long speech in my own defence. On this occasion I was fined ￡100. I did not pay the sum, so that my goods at Cambridge were sold to a sufficient amount to realise the fine. Kind friends, however, bought them in and gave them back to me, so that I felt my protest had been somewhat futile. At Trinity, meanwhile, all the younger Fellows had obtained commissions, and the older men naturally wished to do their bit. They therefore deprived me of my lectureship. When the younger men came back at the end of the War I was invited to return, but by this time had no longer any wish to do so.
出典: The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, v.2 chap. 1:The First War, 1968]
詳細情報：http://russell-j.com/beginner/AB21-250.HTM
（訳注： このリーフレットは ‘Rex v. Bertrand Russell: Report of the Proceedings Before the Lord Mayor at the Mansion House Justice Room, 5 June 1916’）。 http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002433198
・・。このことは,ニュルンベルク軍事裁判の時のように裁かれる者が敵側である場合は特にそうである。ニュルンベルクグ裁判の刑事被告人も,もし彼らがドイツ人によって裁かれていたら,有罪の宣告を受けるようなことはなかったであろうと広く一般に認められた。ドイツ政府の敵側（注：連合国側）は,ドイツ人の間で政府に対する不服従行為をしなかったことを（ドイツ人に）有罪の宣告をする理由（弁解）として申し立てたが,もしそのような不服従行為をする兵士が自分たちの側（味方）にいたとしたらその者を（軍法会議にかけて）死刑にしてしまったことだろう。彼らが有罪の宣告をした多くのドイツ人は,そのような犯罪行為はただ上官の命令で行ったに過ぎないと抗弁したが,彼らはその抗弁を受けつけようとしなかった。ニュルンベルク裁判の判事たちは,ドイツ人たちはドイツ政府に対する不服従行為を人間の品位と人道の名において行うべきであったという信念をもっていた。しかしもし彼らが,自分の国の者を裁いているのであって,敵国人を裁いているのではなかったとしたら,そういうふうには考えなかったであろう。しかし私は,味方であろうと敵であろうと,そのこと（敵には厳しく、味方には優しいこと）は真理であると信ずる。
