Steamships, railways, and finally aeroplanes have made it possible for governments to exercise power quickly at great distances. A revolt in the Sahara or in Mesopotamia can now be quelled within a few hours, whereas a hundred years ago it would have required months to send an army, and there would have been great difficulty in preventing it from dying of thirst, like Alexander’s soldiers in Baluchistan. Quite as important as the mobility of persons and goods is the rapidity in the transmission of news. In the war of 1812, the battle of New Orleans was fought after the conclusion of peace, though neither of the opposing armies was aware of this fact. At the end of the Seven Years War, British forces captured Cuba and the Philippines, but this was not known in Europe until peace had been signed. Until the invention of the telegraph, ambassadors in time of peace and generals in time of war had necessarily a very great latitude, since their instructions could not take account of the most recent occurrences. Agents of a distant government were very frequently called upon to act on their own judgment, and thus became much more than mere transmitters of a centrally directed policy. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_110.HTM
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.10 The Roman Empire learnt from the Persians, through the Macedonians, how to fortify the central government by means of roads. Imperial messengers could travel at an average rate often miles an hour, day and night, throughout Western and Southern Europe, North Africa, and Western Asia. But in each province the imperial post was controlled by the military commander, who could therefore move his armies without the knowledge of anyone not in their line of march. The swiftness of the legions and the tardiness of news resulted often in advantage to rebels against the Emperor in Rome. Gibbon, in telling of Constantine’s march from the north of Gaul to invade Italy, contrasts the ease of his movements with the difficulty of Hannibal’s : “When Hannibal marched from Gaul into Italy, he was obliged, first to discover, and then to open, a way over mountains and through savage nations that had never yielded a passage to a regular army. The Alps were then guarded by nature, they are now fortified by art. But in the course of the inter-mediate period, the generals, who have attempted the passage, have seldom experienced any diffiiculty or resistance. In the age of Constantine, the peasants of the mountains were civilized and obedient subjects ; the country was plentifully stocked with provisions, highways, which the Romans had carried over the Alps, opened several communications between Gaul and Italy. Constantine preferred the road of the Cottian Alps, or as it is now called of Mount Cenis, and led his troops with such active diligence, that he descended into the plain of Piedmont before the court of Maxentius (in Rome) had received any certain intelligence of his departure from the banks of the Rhine.” The result was that Maxentius was defeated and Christianity became the religion of the State. The history of the world might have been different if the Romans had had worse roads or a swifter means of transmitting news. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_100.HTM
権力の集中は，政治の領域においては，常に支配者によって追求されてきたものであり（であるが），それは常に被支配者によって抵抗されてきたというものではなかった。権力の集中は，名目上は，古代の帝国のほうが近代の政体の最も独裁的なもの（さえ）よりも完璧であったが，実際においては，権力の集中には技術的な限界があった。古代の君主にとって最も緊急の問題は，移動の問題であった。エジプトとバビロニアでは，この移動の問題は大河によって促進された。しかし，ペルシャの統治は道路に依存していた。ヘロドトスは，サルディス(Sardis)からスーサ(Susa)に至る，延長1500マイルの非常に長い王道を，平時には王の使者が旅し，戦時には王の軍隊が進軍した，と記している。 ヘロドトスはこう書いている。「 当の（問題の）道路の実話（true account 正しい説明）は次の通りである。王立の宿場(Royal stations)が全王道に沿って（多数）存在し，また立派な隊商宿（caravanserais）も同様である。そして王道全体に渡って，居住区が広がっており（？ and throughout, it traverses an inhabited tract），危険はない。・・・フリギア（王国）(Phrygia)を後にすると，ハリス河(注：the Halys 現在のトルコを流れるクズルウルマク川のこと)を渡らなければならない。そこには関門が（いくつか）あって，河を渡る前に必ずそれらの関門を通過しなければならない。強力な軍隊がその地を警備している。・・・キリキア（Cilicia）とアルメニアとの境界をなすのがユーフラテス河で，小舟で渡らなくてはならない。アルメニアには休憩所が15ケ所，その距離は56ファルサフ半（約180マイル／parasang = ファルサフ）である(?)。警備隊の配置されているところが１ケ所ある。４つの大河がこの地方を交叉しているが，それらの河は全て小舟で渡らなくてはならない。・・・宿場の数は111ケ所まで増やされている。事実，サルディスとスーサの間にある休憩所は非常に数が多い。」 彼はさらに続けて次のように述べている。「一日150ハロン（注：furlong ファーロングとも）の割合で旅をしても（軍隊の行軍速度とほぼ同じ），旅を終えるにはきっかり90日はかかるであろう。（注：これで宿場が111もある理由がわかる。）」(ヘロドトス『歴史書』第五巻，五二章，五三章。ローリンソン訳) このような（長い）道路は，帝国の拡大を可能にしたが，それによって王が遠隔地の地方総督（satraps）の監督を事細かに行うことを可能にしなかった（不可能であった）。馬にのった使者は，サルディスからスーサまで一ケ月で知らせを持っていけたかもしれないが，しかし，軍隊がサルディスからスーサまで行軍するのには三ケ月はかかるであろう。イオニア人がペルシャ（帝国）に叛旗を翻した時にも，小アジアにいるペルシャ軍を迎えうつまでに，彼らイオニア人は幾月も彼らの自由にできた（のである）（注：any troops not already in Asia Minor 小アジアをいまだ立っていない部隊）。古代の帝国は全て，叛乱に悩まされたが，その叛乱を指導したものは，しばしば地方の総督（守備隊長）であった。そうして，明白な坂乱が起きていない場合でさえ，征服が最近行われたばかりというのでもないかぎり，地方における自治はほとんど避けがたく，時間の経過とともに，独立へと発展しがちであった。古代の大国で，今日と同程度に近くまで，中央からの支配が及んだ国は一つもない。そうして，その主な理由は，迅速な移動の欠如にあった。
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.9 Concentration of power, in the political sphere, has always been sought by rulers, and has not always been resisted by those over whom they ruled. Nominally, it was more complete in the great empires of antiquity than in even the most dictatorial of modern regimes, but in practice it was limited to what was technically possible. The most urgent problem for ancient monarchs was that of mobility. In Egypt and Babylonia, this was facilitated by the great rivers; but the Persian rule depended upon roads. Herodotus describes the great royal road from Sardis to Susa, a distance of about 1,500 miles, along which the King’s messengers travelled in time of peace, and the King’s armies in time of war. “The true account of the road in question,” he says, “is the following: Royal stations exist along its whole length, and excellent caravanserais ; and throughout, it traverses an inhabited tract, and is free from danger…. On leaving Phrygia the Halys has to be crossed; and here are gates through which you must needs pass ere you can traverse the stream. A strong force guards this post…. The boundary between Cilicia and Armenia is the river Euphrates, which it is necessary to cross in boats. In Armenia the resting-places are fifteen in number, and the distance is 56½; parasangs (about 180 miles). There is one place where a guard is posted. Four large streams intersect this district, all of which have to be crossed by means of boats. :.. The entire number of stations is raised to one hundred and eleven; so many are in fact the resting-places that one finds between Sardis and Susa.” He goes on to state that, “travelling at the rate of 150 furlongs a day” (about the speed of an army), “one will take exactly ninety days to perform the journey. (note: Book V, Chapters 52, 53. Rawlirwon’s translation.) Such a road, though it made an extended empire possible, did not enable the King to exercise any detailed control over the satraps of distant provinces. A messenger on horseback might bring news from Sardis to Susa in a month, but an army would require three months to march from Susa to Sardis. When the Ionians revolted against Persia, they therefore had a number of months at their disposal before they had to meet any troops not already in Asia Minor. All ancient empires suffered from revolts, often led by provincial governors ; and even when no overt revolt occurred, local autonomy was almost unavoidable except when conquest was recent, and was apt, in the course of time, to develop into independence. No large State of antiquity was governed from the centre to nearly the same extent as is now customary; and the chief reason for this was lack of rapid mobility.
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.8 It might be urged that the United States is an exception to the principle that a State conquers what it can. It is obvious that the conquest of Mexico, and indeed of all Latin America, would offer no serious difficulties if the United States cared to undertake the task. The usual motives for political conquest, however, are at present inhibited in this case by various counteracting forces. Before the Civil War, the Southern States had imperialistic tendencies which found an outlet in the Mexican War, leading to the annexation of an immense territory. After the Civil War, the settlement and economic development of the West was a sufficient task to absorb the energies of even the most energetic nation. As soon as this business had been brought to some sort of conclusion, the Spanish-American War of 1898 gave vent to a fresh impulse of imperialism. But annexation of territory has difficulties under the American Constitution : it involves the admission of new voters, who may be thought undesirable, and – -what is more important — it extends the area of internal free trade, and is therefore damaging to important economic interests. The Monroe Doctrine, which involves a virtual protectorate over Latin America, is therefore more satisfactory to the dominant interests than annexation would be. If political conquest were economically advantageous, no doubt it would soon take place.
今 (just) 述べてきたことは抽象的すぎて，（部分的)修正なしでは真実とは言えない。小国は，自力によってではなく，大国の嫉妬によって、存在する。たとえば，（小国の）ベルギーが存在するのは，イギリスとフランスにとって（ベルギーの存在が）好都合だからである（注：両国にとって緩衝地帯となる）。ポルトガルが広大な植民地をもっているのは，大国同志がそれらの植民地の分割方法について意見の一致を見ないからである。戦争は重大な事柄なので，もし任意の強国がある国の領土をとってしまおうと思えば失ってしまう領土でも，国家は，かなりの期間、領土を保持できることがある。しかしそういった考慮（事項）も，けっして我々の一般原理をくつがえすものではない。（即ち）そういった考慮は，露骨な権力の作用に猶予を与える摩擦力を取り入れているだけなのである。（注：猶予を与えているだけで、権力の実際の姿は変わらない。／ちなみに，they only introduce frictional forces … のところを、東宮氏は「つまり，★強国★は，露骨な権力の作用に猶予を与える摩擦力を用いているに過ぎないのである」と訳出している。想像力を働かせ過ぎではないか？ この一つ前の文の主語は considerations と複数形であるが、その前の a State; any strong State は全て単数形となっており、単数形の主語を複数形の they で受けるはずがないことに気づくべきであろう。 ）
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.7 What has just been said is too abstract to be true without modification. Small States exist, not by their own power, but through the jealousies of large ones; Belgium, e.g., exists because its existence is convenient for England and France. Portugal has large colonies, because the Great Powers cannot agree about how to divide them. Since war is a serious business, a State may, for a considerable time, retain territory which it would lose if any strong State chose to take it. But such considerations do not destroy our general principle; they only introduce frictional forces which delay the operation of crude power.
このことの最も明らかな例は国家である。いかなる国家も，十分強力である場合，外国の征服を目指す（ものである）。これと反対の（注：外国侵略をめざさない）明らかな例が生じるのは，国家が経験から，自身（自国）がそう思うほど強くないということを知っている場合か，あるいは，未経験から，実際そうであるよりも強くないと信じている場合か，そのどちらかの場合だけである。おおざっぱな原則は，国家というものは，征服できるものは全て征服し，征服を中止するのは，国家が辺境（a frontier）に達して，そこで他の国家あるいは国家群が自国の圧力と同じ強さの圧力を及ぼせる場合だけである。大英帝国がアフガニスタンを手に入れなかったのは，アフガニスタンでは，ロシアは英国と同様に強力であるからである。ナポレオンが（北アメリカの）ルイジアナをアメリカ合衆国に売ったのは，彼がルイジアナを防衛することが不可能であったからである，といった具合である。内在的な力ということに関するかぎり，あらゆる国家は世界的な規模になろうとする傾向がある。しかし，国家権力は，多かれ少なかれ、地理的なものである。（即ち）通常，国家権力はその中心から広がり（radiates from 放射し），中心からの距離が増すに連れてその影響力は弱まっていく。従って，中心からより遠くの距離であるいはより近くの距離で，国家権力は何らかの他の国家権力と平衡状態にあり，そこが国境となるであろう。ただし伝統の力がこれに干渉する場合は話は違ってくる（注：unless the force of tradition interferes 伝統の力の影響により、内部から平衡状態が崩れるということ？）。
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.6 The most obvious example of this is the State. Every State which is sufficiently powerful aims at foreign conquest ; apparent instances to the contrary only arise where a State, from experience, knows itself to be less strong than it seems, or, from inexperience, believes itself to be less strong than it is. The broad rule is that a State conquers what it can, and stops only when it reaches a frontier at which some other State or States can exert a pressure as strong as its own. Great Britain has not acquired Afghanistan, because Russia is as powerful there as the British are ; Napoleon sold Louisiana to the United States because it was impossible for him to defend it; and so on. So far as intrinsic forces are concerned, every State tends to become world-wide. But the power of a State is to a greater or smaller extent geographical: it usually radiates from a centre, and grows less as the distance from the centre increases. Consequently, at a greater or smaller distance from the centre, its power is in equilibrium with that of some other State, and there the frontiers will be, unless the force of tradition interferes.
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.5 There are two important respects in which organizations may differ : one is size, the other is what one might call density of power, by which I mean the degree of control which they exert over their members. Owing to the love of power which is to be expected in those who acquire governmental posts, every organization will, in the absence of any counter-acting force, tend to grow both in size and in density of power. It is possible for either form of growth to be stopped by intrinsic causes ; an international chess club, for example, may come to contain all chess-players of sufficient excellence, and is not likely to wish to control any of the activities of its members except those connected with chess. It might, under an energetic secretary, seek to make more people “chess-conscious,” but this would be unlikely to happen if the secretary were expected to be a good chess-player; and if it did happen, the club might be ruined by the defection of the best players. But such cases are exceptional; where the purpose of the organization is one making a general appeal – e.g., wealth, or political domination – growth in size is only stopped either by the pressure of other organizations, or by the organization in question becoming world-wide ; and growth in density is only stopped where love of personal independence becomes overwhelmingly strong. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_050.HTM
権力を求めてする競争(権力闘争)には二種類ある。組織体同志の間での競争と、一つの組織体の中での指導権を求める個人同志の間の闘争（の二種類）である。組織体同志の間の競争は、多少とも類似した目的を持っているけれども両者の目的が両立しない場合にのみ生じる。競争は経済的なもの（競争）かも知れないし、軍事的なもの（競争）かも知れないし、宣伝によるもの（競争）かも知れないし、あるいはまたこれら３つの方法のうちのいずれか２つないしその全てを含むかも知れない。ナポレオン三世が自分を皇帝にしたてあげようと従事していた時（engaged in 忙しくしていた時）、彼は自分の利益に忠誠的である組織（体）を作り，その後その組織体の覇権を確保しなくてはならなかった。この目的のために、彼は何人かの人々に煙草を与え － これは経済的なもの －、またある人々にはわざわざ自分は自分の伯父（注：ナポレオン・ボナパルト）の甥にあたると注意喚起し － これは宣伝 －、最後には自分の敵の何人かを射殺した － これは軍事的なもの －（注：シンプソン『ルイ・ナポレオンの台頭』／Simpson, The Rise of Louis Napoleon 参照））。一方（その間），彼の敵達は、もっぱら共和政体を褒め称えるだけに止め（confined themselves to praising）、そうして，煙草も弾丸も無視していた。民主主義国であった国に対して独裁権を獲得する技術は、ギリシア時代以来お馴染みであり、それには常に，（ナポレオン三世と同様の the same mixture の the は何を指すか注意）賄賂と宣伝と暴力が伴っている。けれども、これは我々の当面の主題ではなく、我々の現在の主題は組織体の生物学である。
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.4 Competition for power is of two sorts: between organizations, and between individuals for leadership within an organization. Competition between organizations only arises when they have objects which are more or less similar, but incompatible; it may be economic, or military, or by means of propaganda, or may involve any two or all three of these methods. When Napoleon III was engaged in making himself Emperor, he had to create an organization devoted to his interests, and then to secure its supremacy. For this purpose, he gave cigars to some people — this was economic; to others he pointed out that he was the nephew of his uncle — this was propaganda ; finally he shot a number of opponents — this was military. (note:See Simpson, The Rise of Louis Napoleon). His opponents, meanwhile, had confined themselves to praising the Republican form of government, and had neglected the cigars and bullets. The technique of acquiring dictatorship over what has been a democracy has been familiar since Greek times, and always involves the same mixture of bribery, propaganda and violence. This, however, is not our present theme, which is the biology of organizations. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_040.HTM
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.3 Even a completely democratic government –if such a thing were possible– involves a redistribution of power. If every man has an equal voice in joint decisions, and if there are (say) a million members, every man has a millionth part of the power over the whole million, instead of complete power over himself and none over others, as he would have if he were a solitary wild animal. This produces a very different psychology from that of an anarchic collection of individuals. And where — as must always be the case to some extent — the government is not completely democratic, the psychological effect is increased. The members of the government have more power than the others, even if they are democratically elected ; and so do officials appointed by a democratically elected government. The larger the organization, the greater the power of the executive. Thus every increase in the size of organizations increases inequalities of power by simultaneously diminishing the independence of ordinary members and enlarging the scope of the initiative of the government. The average man submits because much more can be achieved cooperatively than singly; the exceptionally power-loving man rejoices, since it provides his opportunity — unless indeed, the government is hereditary, or the power-loving individual belongs to a group (such as Jews in some countries) which is not allowed to occupy positions of importance. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_030.HTM
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.2 Power is dependent upon organization in the main, but not wholly. Purely psychological power, such as that of Plato or Galileo, may exist without any corresponding social institution. But as a rule even such power is not important unless it is propagated by a Church, a political party, or some analogous social organism. For the present, I shall ignore power which is not connected with an organization. An organization is a set of people who are combined in virtue of activities directed to common ends. It may be purely voluntary, like a club; it may be a natural biological group, like a family or a clan; it may be compulsory, like a State; or it may be a complicated mixture, like a railway company. The purpose of the organization may be explicit or unexpressed, conscious or unconscious; it may be military or political, economic or religious, educational or athletic, and so on. Every organization, whatever its character and whatever its purpose, involves some redistribution of power. There must be a government, which takes decisions in the name of the whole body, and has more power than the single members have, at any rate as regards the purposes for which the organization exists. As men grow more civilized and technique grows more complicated, the advantages of combination become increasingly evident. But combination always involves some surrender of indenendence : we may acquire increased power over others, but they also acquire power over us. More and more, the important decisions are those of bodies of men, not of single individuals. And the decisions of bodies of men, unless the members are very few, have to be effected through governments. Thus government necessarily plays a much larger part in the life of a modern civilized community than in that of pre-industrial societies. ） 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_020.HTM