国家以外の組織体は（も），武力を使用できないこと以外は，大部分，我々がこれまで考察してきたものと同種の（諸）法則に支配されている。（なお）私は，クラブのような，権力衝動に’はけ口’をほとんど与えない組織(体)は考慮の外に置くことにする。我々の目的からいって最も重要なものは，政党，教会，事業法人である。大部分の教会は －教会の目的が実現するとはほとんど思っていなくても－ 世界的規模となることを目ざす（ものである）。（また）教会の大部分は，自分たちの信者（成員）の最も私的な関心事について，たとえば結婚とか子どもの教育などについて，規制をしようと努める。それ（私的関心事への関与）が可能だということがわかると，教会は －チベット及びペテロ世襲領(the patrimony of St. Peter)において，またある程度まで，宗教改革に至るまでの西欧全体において－ 国家の機能を奪ってきた。教会の権力衝動は，若干の例外を除いて，（権力衝動を発揮する）機会の欠如及び異端ないし（教会の）分裂という形での反抗に対する恐怖によってのみ限界をもうけられてきた。けれども，国家主義は，多くの国々において教会の権力を著しく減小させ，以前は宗教にはけ口を見出していた種々の（強い）感情を国家のほうに転移させた（向ける方向を変えさせた）*注。宗教のカの減少は，国家主義及び民族国家のカの増大の，一部は原因であり，一部は結果である。 （* 注）故人の A. S. ヘウィンズ(William Albert Samuel Hewins,1865-1931)は、ジョウゼフ・チェンバレン(1836-1914, 英国のグラッドストン内閣で通商大臣や自治大臣を務めた)が関税改正（論者）に転向するのを手助けしたが，彼は，自分の祖先は熱烈なローマン・カトリック教徒であったが，しかし，自分の気持は彼の祖先の気持が教会に結びついていたのと同じように大英帝国に結びついている，と私に語った。これは，右に述べた気持の展開の典型（的な一例）である。
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.16 Organizations other than States are, in the main, subject to laws of the same kind as those that we have been considering, except that they cannot use force. I omit from consideration those that afford little outlet to power-impulses, such as clubs. The most important, for our purposes, are political parties, Churches, and business corporations. Most Churches aim at being world-wide, however little they may expect their aim to be realized; also most of them endeavour to regulate some of the most intimate concerns of their members, such as marriage and the education of children. When it has proved possible, Churches have usurped the functions of the State, as in Tibet and the patrimony of St. Peter, and to some extent throughout Western Europe until the Reformation. The power impulses of Churches, with some exceptions, have been limited only by lack of opportunity, and by the fear of revolt in the shape of heresy or schism. Nationalism, however, has greatly diminished their power in many countries, and has transferred to the State many emotions which formerly found their outlet in religion. (note: The late W. A. S. Hewins, who was instrumental in the conversion of Joseph Chamberlain to tariff reform, told me that his ancestors had been ardent Roman Catholics, but that his emotions attached themselves to the British Empire as theirs had to the Church. This was a typical development.） The diminution in the strength of religion is partly the cause and partly the effect of nationalism and the increased strength of national States. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_160.HTM
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.15 Love of independence is, in most cases, not an abstract dislike of external interference, but aversion from some one form of control which the government thinks desirable — prohibition, conscription, religious conformity, or what not. Sometimes such sentiments can be gradually overcome by propaganda and education, which can indefinitely weaken the desire for personal independence. Many forces conspire to make for uniformity in modern communities – schools, newspapers, cinema, radio, drill, etc. Density of population has the same effect. The position of momentary equilibrium between the sentiment of independence and the love of power tends, therefore, under modern conditions, to shift further and further in the direction of power, thus facilitating the creation and success of totalitarian States. By education, love of independence can be weakened to an extent to which, at present, no limits are known. How far the internal power of the State may be gradually increased without provoking revolt it is impossible to say; but there seems no reason to doubt that, given time, it can be increased far beyond the point at present 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_150.HTM
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.14 As regards density of power, or intensity of organization (as it may also be called), the questions involved are complex and very important. The State, in every civilized country, is far more active now than at any former time; in Russia, Germany, and Italy it interferes in almost all human concerns. Since men love power, and since, on the average, those who achieve power love it more than most, the men who control the State may be expected, in normal circumstances, to desire an increase of its internal activities just as much as an increase of its territory. Since there are solid reasons for augmenting the functions of the State, there will be a predisposition, on the part of ordinary citizens, in favour of acquiescing in the wishes of the government in this respect. There is, however, a certain desire for independence, which will, at some point, become strong enough to prevent, at least temporarily, any further increase in the intensity of the organization. Consequently love of independence in the citizens and love of power in the officials will, when organization reaches a certain intensity, be in at least temporary equilibrium, so that if organization were increased love of independence would become the stronger force, and if it were diminished official love of power would be the stronger. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_140.HTM
（ここで）技術的な要因は遠隔地（at a distance 少し離れたところ）に対して国家権力をふるうことを容易にする方向にばかり働いてきた（作用してきた）わけではない，ということに気づくべきである。（即ち）いくつかの点で，技術的要因は逆の効果（結果）をもたらしてきた。ハンニバルの軍隊は，何年も兵站線（line of communications へいたんせん：本国と戦場を連絡する輸送連絡路）を塞いだままで（without keeping open ～ 開くことなく）生存してゆくこと（食いつないでゆく/食べてゆくこと）ができたが（注：敵に自軍の行動がすぐに伝わってしまうことがないため），他方，現代の大軍は，そのような条件では，２，３日も持ちこたえることはできないであろう。海軍も，（お互い）帆にたよっている限り，軍事行動は世界を股にかけるものであった（注：in their operations： operations と複数形になっていることに注意）。（これに対し）今日の海軍は，何度も燃料の補給をしなければならないので，どこかの基地を離れてそう長い間軍事行動をするわけにいかない。ネルソン（提督）の時代には，英国海軍が何処かの海を支配すれば（注：command ここでは「支配する」），それだけでもう世界中の海を支配することとなった（注：大洋は全てつながっているため）。今日の英国海軍は，本国水域を支配するカはもっているかもしれないが，極東では弱いし，バルチック海へはまったく近よることもできない。（注：英国の海軍力は強くなったが、他国も強くなったので、相対的に英国海軍の力は弱くなってしまった。） それにもかかわらず（以上のような例外はあるけれども），一般的な原理/原則は，昔にくらべて今日のほうが，中央から離れた地に（対して）権力をふるうことがより容易となっている。この結果，国家間の競争の激しさが増し，（競争による）勝利を（以前よりも）断乎たるものにした。それは，（勝利による）領土の拡大は，効率を損うことはないからである。世界国家（国家の統一による一つの世界国家）は，今日，技術的には可能であり，また，ある種の過酷な世界大戦での勝利国によって樹立されるかも知れないし、あるいはそれよりもっと可能性があるのは，最も強力な中立諸国による世界国家の樹立である。
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.13 Technical causes, it should be observed, have not operated wholly in the direction of making it easier to exercise the power of the State at a distance; in some respects they have had the opposite effect. Hannibal’s army subsisted for many years without keeping open its line of communications, whereas a large modern army could not last more than two or three days in such conditions. Navies, so long as they depended upon sails, were world-wide in their operations ; now, since they must frequently refuel, they are unable to operate long at a distance from some base. In Nelson’s day, if the British commanded the seas in one region they commanded them everywhere ; now, though they may have command of the home waters, they are weak in the Far East, and have no access to the Baltic. Nevertheless, the broad rule is that it is easier now than in former days to exert power at a distance from the centre. The effect of this is to increase the intensity of competition between States, and to make victory more absolute, since the resulting increase of size need not impair efficiency. A World State is now a technical possibility, and might be established by a victor in some really serious world-war, or, more probably, by the most powerful of the neutrals. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_130.HTM
It is not only the absolute rapidity in the transmission of messages that is important, but also, and still more, the fact that messages travel faster than human beings. Until little over a hundred years ago, neither messages nor anything else could travel faster than a horse. A highwayman could escape to a neighbouring town, and reach it before the news of his crime. Now-a-days, since news arrives first, escape is more difficult. In time of war all rapid means of communication are controlled by governments, and this greatly increases their power. Modern technique, not only through the rapidity in the transmission of messages, but also through railways, telegraph, motor traffic, and governmental propaganda, has made large empires much more capable of stability than they were in former times. Persian satraps and Roman proconsuls had enough independence to make rebellion easy. Alexander’s empire fell apart at his death. The empires of Attila and Jenghis Khan were transitory; and the nations of Europe lost most of their possessions in the New World. But with modern technique most empires are fairly safe except against external attack, and revolution is only to be expected after defeat in war. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_120.HTM
Steamships, railways, and finally aeroplanes have made it possible for governments to exercise power quickly at great distances. A revolt in the Sahara or in Mesopotamia can now be quelled within a few hours, whereas a hundred years ago it would have required months to send an army, and there would have been great difficulty in preventing it from dying of thirst, like Alexander’s soldiers in Baluchistan. Quite as important as the mobility of persons and goods is the rapidity in the transmission of news. In the war of 1812, the battle of New Orleans was fought after the conclusion of peace, though neither of the opposing armies was aware of this fact. At the end of the Seven Years War, British forces captured Cuba and the Philippines, but this was not known in Europe until peace had been signed. Until the invention of the telegraph, ambassadors in time of peace and generals in time of war had necessarily a very great latitude, since their instructions could not take account of the most recent occurrences. Agents of a distant government were very frequently called upon to act on their own judgment, and thus became much more than mere transmitters of a centrally directed policy. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_110.HTM
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.10 The Roman Empire learnt from the Persians, through the Macedonians, how to fortify the central government by means of roads. Imperial messengers could travel at an average rate often miles an hour, day and night, throughout Western and Southern Europe, North Africa, and Western Asia. But in each province the imperial post was controlled by the military commander, who could therefore move his armies without the knowledge of anyone not in their line of march. The swiftness of the legions and the tardiness of news resulted often in advantage to rebels against the Emperor in Rome. Gibbon, in telling of Constantine’s march from the north of Gaul to invade Italy, contrasts the ease of his movements with the difficulty of Hannibal’s : “When Hannibal marched from Gaul into Italy, he was obliged, first to discover, and then to open, a way over mountains and through savage nations that had never yielded a passage to a regular army. The Alps were then guarded by nature, they are now fortified by art. But in the course of the inter-mediate period, the generals, who have attempted the passage, have seldom experienced any diffiiculty or resistance. In the age of Constantine, the peasants of the mountains were civilized and obedient subjects ; the country was plentifully stocked with provisions, highways, which the Romans had carried over the Alps, opened several communications between Gaul and Italy. Constantine preferred the road of the Cottian Alps, or as it is now called of Mount Cenis, and led his troops with such active diligence, that he descended into the plain of Piedmont before the court of Maxentius (in Rome) had received any certain intelligence of his departure from the banks of the Rhine.” The result was that Maxentius was defeated and Christianity became the religion of the State. The history of the world might have been different if the Romans had had worse roads or a swifter means of transmitting news. 出典： Power, 1938. 詳細情報：https://russell-j.com/beginner/POWER11_100.HTM
権力の集中は，政治の領域においては，常に支配者によって追求されてきたものであり（であるが），それは常に被支配者によって抵抗されてきたというものではなかった。権力の集中は，名目上は，古代の帝国のほうが近代の政体の最も独裁的なもの（さえ）よりも完璧であったが，実際においては，権力の集中には技術的な限界があった。古代の君主にとって最も緊急の問題は，移動の問題であった。エジプトとバビロニアでは，この移動の問題は大河によって促進された。しかし，ペルシャの統治は道路に依存していた。ヘロドトスは，サルディス(Sardis)からスーサ(Susa)に至る，延長1500マイルの非常に長い王道を，平時には王の使者が旅し，戦時には王の軍隊が進軍した，と記している。 ヘロドトスはこう書いている。「 当の（問題の）道路の実話（true account 正しい説明）は次の通りである。王立の宿場(Royal stations)が全王道に沿って（多数）存在し，また立派な隊商宿（caravanserais）も同様である。そして王道全体に渡って，居住区が広がっており（？ and throughout, it traverses an inhabited tract），危険はない。・・・フリギア（王国）(Phrygia)を後にすると，ハリス河(注：the Halys 現在のトルコを流れるクズルウルマク川のこと)を渡らなければならない。そこには関門が（いくつか）あって，河を渡る前に必ずそれらの関門を通過しなければならない。強力な軍隊がその地を警備している。・・・キリキア（Cilicia）とアルメニアとの境界をなすのがユーフラテス河で，小舟で渡らなくてはならない。アルメニアには休憩所が15ケ所，その距離は56ファルサフ半（約180マイル／parasang = ファルサフ）である(?)。警備隊の配置されているところが１ケ所ある。４つの大河がこの地方を交叉しているが，それらの河は全て小舟で渡らなくてはならない。・・・宿場の数は111ケ所まで増やされている。事実，サルディスとスーサの間にある休憩所は非常に数が多い。」 彼はさらに続けて次のように述べている。「一日150ハロン（注：furlong ファーロングとも）の割合で旅をしても（軍隊の行軍速度とほぼ同じ），旅を終えるにはきっかり90日はかかるであろう。（注：これで宿場が111もある理由がわかる。）」(ヘロドトス『歴史書』第五巻，五二章，五三章。ローリンソン訳) このような（長い）道路は，帝国の拡大を可能にしたが，それによって王が遠隔地の地方総督（satraps）の監督を事細かに行うことを可能にしなかった（不可能であった）。馬にのった使者は，サルディスからスーサまで一ケ月で知らせを持っていけたかもしれないが，しかし，軍隊がサルディスからスーサまで行軍するのには三ケ月はかかるであろう。イオニア人がペルシャ（帝国）に叛旗を翻した時にも，小アジアにいるペルシャ軍を迎えうつまでに，彼らイオニア人は幾月も彼らの自由にできた（のである）（注：any troops not already in Asia Minor 小アジアをいまだ立っていない部隊）。古代の帝国は全て，叛乱に悩まされたが，その叛乱を指導したものは，しばしば地方の総督（守備隊長）であった。そうして，明白な坂乱が起きていない場合でさえ，征服が最近行われたばかりというのでもないかぎり，地方における自治はほとんど避けがたく，時間の経過とともに，独立へと発展しがちであった。古代の大国で，今日と同程度に近くまで，中央からの支配が及んだ国は一つもない。そうして，その主な理由は，迅速な移動の欠如にあった。
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.9 Concentration of power, in the political sphere, has always been sought by rulers, and has not always been resisted by those over whom they ruled. Nominally, it was more complete in the great empires of antiquity than in even the most dictatorial of modern regimes, but in practice it was limited to what was technically possible. The most urgent problem for ancient monarchs was that of mobility. In Egypt and Babylonia, this was facilitated by the great rivers; but the Persian rule depended upon roads. Herodotus describes the great royal road from Sardis to Susa, a distance of about 1,500 miles, along which the King’s messengers travelled in time of peace, and the King’s armies in time of war. “The true account of the road in question,” he says, “is the following: Royal stations exist along its whole length, and excellent caravanserais ; and throughout, it traverses an inhabited tract, and is free from danger…. On leaving Phrygia the Halys has to be crossed; and here are gates through which you must needs pass ere you can traverse the stream. A strong force guards this post…. The boundary between Cilicia and Armenia is the river Euphrates, which it is necessary to cross in boats. In Armenia the resting-places are fifteen in number, and the distance is 56½; parasangs (about 180 miles). There is one place where a guard is posted. Four large streams intersect this district, all of which have to be crossed by means of boats. :.. The entire number of stations is raised to one hundred and eleven; so many are in fact the resting-places that one finds between Sardis and Susa.” He goes on to state that, “travelling at the rate of 150 furlongs a day” (about the speed of an army), “one will take exactly ninety days to perform the journey. (note: Book V, Chapters 52, 53. Rawlirwon’s translation.) Such a road, though it made an extended empire possible, did not enable the King to exercise any detailed control over the satraps of distant provinces. A messenger on horseback might bring news from Sardis to Susa in a month, but an army would require three months to march from Susa to Sardis. When the Ionians revolted against Persia, they therefore had a number of months at their disposal before they had to meet any troops not already in Asia Minor. All ancient empires suffered from revolts, often led by provincial governors ; and even when no overt revolt occurred, local autonomy was almost unavoidable except when conquest was recent, and was apt, in the course of time, to develop into independence. No large State of antiquity was governed from the centre to nearly the same extent as is now customary; and the chief reason for this was lack of rapid mobility.
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.8 It might be urged that the United States is an exception to the principle that a State conquers what it can. It is obvious that the conquest of Mexico, and indeed of all Latin America, would offer no serious difficulties if the United States cared to undertake the task. The usual motives for political conquest, however, are at present inhibited in this case by various counteracting forces. Before the Civil War, the Southern States had imperialistic tendencies which found an outlet in the Mexican War, leading to the annexation of an immense territory. After the Civil War, the settlement and economic development of the West was a sufficient task to absorb the energies of even the most energetic nation. As soon as this business had been brought to some sort of conclusion, the Spanish-American War of 1898 gave vent to a fresh impulse of imperialism. But annexation of territory has difficulties under the American Constitution : it involves the admission of new voters, who may be thought undesirable, and – -what is more important — it extends the area of internal free trade, and is therefore damaging to important economic interests. The Monroe Doctrine, which involves a virtual protectorate over Latin America, is therefore more satisfactory to the dominant interests than annexation would be. If political conquest were economically advantageous, no doubt it would soon take place.
今 (just) 述べてきたことは抽象的すぎて，（部分的)修正なしでは真実とは言えない。小国は，自力によってではなく，大国の嫉妬によって、存在する。たとえば，（小国の）ベルギーが存在するのは，イギリスとフランスにとって（ベルギーの存在が）好都合だからである（注：両国にとって緩衝地帯となる）。ポルトガルが広大な植民地をもっているのは，大国同志がそれらの植民地の分割方法について意見の一致を見ないからである。戦争は重大な事柄なので，もし任意の強国がある国の領土をとってしまおうと思えば失ってしまう領土でも，国家は，かなりの期間、領土を保持できることがある。しかしそういった考慮（事項）も，けっして我々の一般原理をくつがえすものではない。（即ち）そういった考慮は，露骨な権力の作用に猶予を与える摩擦力を取り入れているだけなのである。（注：猶予を与えているだけで、権力の実際の姿は変わらない。／ちなみに，they only introduce frictional forces … のところを、東宮氏は「つまり，★強国★は，露骨な権力の作用に猶予を与える摩擦力を用いているに過ぎないのである」と訳出している。想像力を働かせ過ぎではないか？ この一つ前の文の主語は considerations と複数形であるが、その前の a State; any strong State は全て単数形となっており、単数形の主語を複数形の they で受けるはずがないことに気づくべきであろう。 ）
Chapter XI: The Biology of Organizations, n.7 What has just been said is too abstract to be true without modification. Small States exist, not by their own power, but through the jealousies of large ones; Belgium, e.g., exists because its existence is convenient for England and France. Portugal has large colonies, because the Great Powers cannot agree about how to divide them. Since war is a serious business, a State may, for a considerable time, retain territory which it would lose if any strong State chose to take it. But such considerations do not destroy our general principle; they only introduce frictional forces which delay the operation of crude power.