* 左上イラスト出典:ラッセル(著),東宮隆(訳)『図説西洋哲学思想史-西洋の智恵』(社会思想社,1968) * 右上写真(ラッセルは,1907年に,ウィンブルドン選挙区から立候補:(出典)R. Clark's B. Russell and His World, 1981. 以上の実例から,4つの一般的な格言を思いつく。これらの格言は,その真理が十分に理解されたならば,'被害妄想の適切な予防薬となるだろう。 (格言1)あなたの動機は,必ずしも自分自身で思っているほど'利他的'ではないことを忘れてはいけない。 (格言2)自分自身の長所を過大評価してはいけない。 (格言3)あなたが自分自身に持つほどの大きな関心を他人もあなたに持つと期待していけない。 (格言4)大部分の人が,あなたを迫害したいといった特別な欲求を抱いているというほど,あなたのことを考えている,などと想像してはいけない。 これらの格言のそれぞれについて,順に,少しコメントをしておこう。
そして,食事にあてはまることは,ほかのあらゆることにもあてはまる。なしとげることが何であろうと,ある程度の'熱意の助け'なしには,十分なしとげることはできず,そして,いくらかの'利己主義的な動機'がなくては,熱意を持つことはむずかしい。以上の見方からすれば,利己主義的な動機の中には,妻子を敵から守ろうとする衝動のように,自分と生物学的な関係のある人たちにかかわる動機も含めるべきであろう。この程度の利他主義は,正常な人間性の一部であるが,因習的な道徳で教えこまれているような度合いはそうではなく,非常にまれにしか達成されない。それゆえ,おのれの道徳的卓越性を高く評価したい人たちは,およそ達成したなどということはありえないはずの高度の没我性(無私)を自分は達成したのだ,と自分自身を納得させなければならなくなる。そして,ここより,気高さを得ようとする努力は,容易に被害妄想へと導く種類の'自己欺瞞'と結びつくようになる。 |
These illustrations suggest four general maxims, which will prove an adequate preventive of persecution mania if their truth is sufficiently realised. The first is: remember that your motives are not always as altruistic as they seem to yourself. The second is: don't over-estimate your own merits. The third is: don't expect others to take as much interest in you as you do yourself. And the fourth is: don't imagine that most people give enough thought to you to have any special desire to persecute you. I shall say a few words about each of these maxims in turn. Suspicion of one's own motives is especially necessary for the philanthropist and the executive; such people have a vision of how the world, or some part of it, should be, and they feel, sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly, that in realising their vision they will be conferring a boon upon mankind or some section of it. They do not, however, adequately realise that the individuals affected by their operations have each an equal right to his own view as to the sort of world he wants. A man of the executive type is quite sure that his vision is right, and that any contrary one is wrong. But his subjective certainly affords no proof that he is objectively right. Moreover, his belief is very often only a camouflage for the pleasure that he derives from contemplating changes of which he is the cause. And in addition to love of power there is another motive, namely vanity, which operates strongly in such cases. The high-minded idealist who stands for Parliament - on this matter I speak from experience - is astonished by the cynicism of the electorate which assumes that he only desires the glory of writing the letters 'M.P.' after his name. When the contest is over and he has time to think, it occurs to him that perhaps after all the cynical electors were in the right. Idealism causes simple motives to wear strange disguises, and therefore some dash of realistic cynicism does not come amiss in our public men. Conventional morality inculcates a degree of altruism of which human nature is scarcely capable, and those who pride themselves upon their virtue often imagine that they attain this unattainable ideal. The immense majority of even the noblest persons' actions have self-regarding motives, nor is this to be regretted, since, if it were otherwise, the human race could not survive. A man who spent his time seeing that others were fed and forgot to feed himself would perish. He may, of course, take nourishment solely in order to provide himself with the necessary strength to plunge again into the battle against evil, but it is doubtful whether food eaten with this motive could be adequately digested, since the flow of saliva would be insufficiently stimulated. It is better therefore that a man should eat because he enjoys his food than that the time he spends at his meals should be solely inspired by a desire for the public good. And what applies to eating applies to everything else. Whatever is to be done can only be done adequately by the help of a certain zest, and zest is difficult without some self-regarding motive. I should include among self-regarding motives, from this point of view, those that concern persons biologically connected with oneself, such as the impulse to the defence of wife and children against enemies. This degree of altruism is part of normal human nature, but the degree inculcated in conventional ethics is not, and is very rarely attained genuinely. People who wish to have a high opinion of their own moral excellence have therefore to persuade themselves that they have achieved a degree of unselfishness that it is very unlikely that they have achieved, and hence the endeavour after saintliness comes to be connected with self-deception of a kind that easily leads on to persecution mania. |
(掲載日:2005.09.27/更新日:2010.4.6)