第15章 「真理」の定義 n.17 - 「知識」と「信念」との関係
自著の『意味と真理との研究』において展開した真理の理論は、根本において「対応説」 (correspondence theory) 、即ち、ひとつの文または信念が「真」であるとき、それはひとつまたはそれ以上の事実への何らかの関係によって(in virtue of)そうである、という説である。しかし,その関係は必ずしも単純なものではなく、当の文の構造により、かつ、経験に対して主張されるものの関係により、様々な形をとる。 このような多様性によりどうしても事は複雑となるが、対応説(上の理論)は、明白な誤まり(demonstative error)を避けながら(避けつつ)、とにかくも(in any way)できる限り常識に執着することを目指しているのである。 |
Chapter 15, n.17The definition of 'truth' does not, of itself, afford a definition of 'knowledge'. Knowledge consists of certain true beliefs, but not of all of them. The stock example to the contrary is that of a clock which has stopped but which I believe to be going and which I happen to look at when, by chance, it shows the right time. In that case, I have a true belief as to the time, but not knowledge. The question of what constitutes knowledge is, however, a very large subject which I do not propose to discuss in the present chapter.The theory of truth developed in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth is fundamentally a correspondence theory -- that is to say, that when a sentence or belief is 'true', it is so in virtue of some relation to one or more facts; but the relation is not always simple, and varies both according to the structure of the sentence concerned and according to the relation of what is asserted to experience. Although this variation introduces unavoidable complexities, the theory aims at as close an adherence to common sense as is in any way compatible with the avoidance of demonstrable error. |