第15章 「真理」の定義 n.11 - 信念の本質的性格
この探求において、私は最も単純かつ原始的で明白な事例から、より困難かつ複雑で疑わしい事例へ進もうと試みた(try to proceed)。私はこのやり方(procedure 手順)が、一般的な方法論的理由で誰もが採用するやり方(手順)であると思っていたが、しかし「真理」の定義に関心をもつ大多数の著者は全く異なったやり方(手順)をしていることに気づいた。彼らは複雑なものまたは疑わしいもの、たとえば、引力(重力)の法則とか神の存在とか 量子理論、などから始める。彼らは平明な事実、たとえば「私は暑く感ずる」といったもので頭を悩ますようなことはしない。 この(私の)批評は、プラグマティスト(実際主義者)だけでなく論理実証主義者にも、同様に当てはまる。 ほとんど全ての学派の哲学者達は、個別的事実に関する我々の知識について探求することなく、むしろ、一般的法則に関する我々の知識から探求を始めようとする。これは彼らの考えの大部分を損う(vitiate 価値を低下させる)根本的な誤謬である、と私は考える。 |
Chapter 15, n.11Belief, as I understand the term, is a state of an organism involving no very direct relation to the fact or facts which make the belief true or false. In a person who knows language, all except the simplest beliefs will be expressed in words, but the use of words is only one of the states of an organism by which a belief can be expressed. The most obvious case of the kind of thing that I have in mind is expectation of a notable event in the near future. For example, if you see a door being blown to by the wind and expect a bang, while you are expecting it you are in a certain state which, if you put it into words, would be expressed by the sentence 'There is about to be a bang'. But it is obvious that you can have the expectation without using words about it. I think it may be said generally that the state of an organism, which is believing something other than its present actual condition, could always, in theory, be described without mentioning the verifier of the belief. This is concealed by the fact that when we mention words we are apt to think that we are mentioning what the words mean. The essential character of a belief is most easily seen in such a case as the one I mentioned a moment ago, when you are expecting something in the immediate future. In this case, you have in the immediate future a feeling which might be expressed by the words 'Quite so!' or by the words 'How surprising!', according as your feeling is true or false. I think it may be said, broadly, that surprise is a criterion of error, but it is not always possible to apply this criterion.In this investigation, I tried to proceed from what is most simple and primitive and unquestionable towards the more difficult complex and doubtful cases. I should have thought this procedure the obvious one to adopt on general methodological grounds, but I found that most of the writers who concern themselves with the definition of ‘truth' proceed in a quite different manner. They start with what is complex or questionable, such as the law of gravitation or the existence of God or quantum theory. They do not trouble their heads with plain matters of fact, such as ‘I feel hot'. This criticism applies not only to pragmatists, but equally to logical positivists. Philosophers of almost every school fail to investigate our knowledge of particular facts, and prefer to start their investigation with our knowledge of general laws. I think this is a fundamental error which vitiates most of their thinking. |