バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』10-07- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第10章:倫理学における権威 n.7 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 10: Authority in Ethics, n.7 | ||
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There is another which takes us further into the heart of the matter. If ethics is to have any objectivity, we want to find a meaning of "ought" such that, when A says to B, "you ought to do X", this does not depend upon who A is. This at once rules out a great many moral codes. If A is a theologically orthodox Aztec, the act X, which he ordains, may be that of killing and eating a human victim. If two nations, M and N, are at war with each other, and A is a member of nation M, the act X, which he commends, may be that of killing as many members of nation N as possible; while if A is a member of nation N, it will be citizens of nation M whose death he will prescribe. If you are a mediaeval Catholic, you will hold that it is wicked to kill by abortion a foetus in the womb of a heretic woman, but that it is virtuous to let the foetus be born and nourished until it becomes old enough to deserve death at the stake. If you are a modern Free-thinker, you will not agree with this opinion. How, then, are we to arrive at objectivity in our definition of "ought"? |