バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.27 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.27 | |||
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When, in the endeavour to formulate an ethical philosophy, we ask ourselves what kinds of acts are objectively right, we shall, whether we know it or not, be influenced by our desires, but probably not by all of them, or at any rate not by all of them equally. We shall realize that general rules are what we are seeking, and that the aims of moral action in general must contain no special reference to ourselves. That every man should pursue his own interest is a logically possible view, but that everybody should pursue Mr. A's interest would be a preposterous theory, unless Mr. A were an absolute monarch or an incarnate Buddha or something of the kind, in which case the general rule could be enunciated without mentioning Mr. A by name. “We all ought to serve the King” is a maxim that might be accepted in the armed services; but if A is the king, it would be misleading to say “We all ought to serve A”, because A might abdicate, and our duty would then be to his successor. We have thus a first principle as to rules of objective rightness: it must be possible to enunciate them without mentioning any individual. |