バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.17 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.17 | |||
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I think myself that "objective rightness" is a concept not capable of precision, but definable, in so far as it is definable, in terms of the desires of persons other than the agent, or rather of many persons of whom the agent is only one. The main purpose of morals is to promote behaviour serving the interests of the group, and not merely of the individual. I think that the "objectively right" act is that which best serves the interest of the group that is regarded as ethically dominant. The difficulty is that this group will be differently defined by different people and in different circumstances. It may be the family, the firm, the nation, the Church, or mankind as a whole; it may even be larger than mankind, and include all sentient beings. Which of these groups is chosen to define "objective rightness” will depend upon what is the collection of human beings that is making the definition. At a French "conseil de famille” it will be the family; at a shareholders’ meeting, the firm; at a court martial, the nation; at a trial of a priest for indiscipline, the Church. At the trials of war criminals, it is nominally the interests of mankind that dominate. In laws regulating vivisection, the animals must, by a fiction, be supposed to be capable of stating their case. |