バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.8 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.8 | |||
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Although, on this theory, a man always does right in obeying his conscience, there is no reason why another man should not wish that his conscience told him something different. A’s conscience may urge him to try to alter the dictates of B’s conscience, for example if A is the European administrator of a cannibal district and B is a cannibal. In such circumstances consciences are very easily altered, as appears from the fact that cannibalism is almost extinct. But such changes, if our present theory is right, must be effected entirely by non-rational means, since no valid argument is conceivable by which it could be shown that one sort of conscience is morally superior to another. It is no use to prove to a man that an act which he regards as right will have unpleasant consequences, for he may say: “what of that? Morality has nothing to do with pleasure”. Of course if he allows himself an argument, you may be able to produce a counter-argument; if, for example, he appeals to Scripture, you may be able to prove that the passage in question has been mistranslated. But so long as he abstains from giving any reason beyond his own conscience he is logically impregnable. |