バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.4 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.4 | |||
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Some might maintain that obedience is what is essential to the concept of moral obligation. This view no longer commands as much assent as it did in former times, when it was regarded as unquestionable that children should obey their parents, wives should obey their husbands, subjects should obey the king, and the king should obey the will of God. But as we have already seen, it is heretical, and very properly so, to hold that right and wrong are constituted by God’s decrees, since in that case they might just as well have been the opposite of what they are. It is always right to obey God’s decrees because God always wills what is right, not because the opposite would be right if He willed it; when we say that God’s decrees are right, we are not uttering a mere tautology. We cannot therefore define “right” as “obeying God’s will”, even though we may hold that obedience to God’s will is always right. Obedience to any human will is not likely to be always right; kings, husbands, and fathers may on occasion command what is wicked. For these reasons, it seems impossible to define moral obligation in terms of obedience, even when the whole of traditional theology is accepted as valid. |