第18章 「批評に対する若干の返答」その4_ 「心とは何か」04
同様のことが快と不快(ライル教授は大多数の心理学者と同じく「苦痛」は「快」の反対ではないと指摘する)とについても言えると私なら考えたであろう(I should have thought)。人は快(喜び)の明らかな兆候を外に表すかも知れないが、快(喜び)を隠すということも十分可能である。たとえば、彼が実は憎んでいるが愛するふりをしているところの人に不幸が起ったことを聞く場合である。棒や石が不快を感ずると想定することは困難であるが、人間が快や不快を感じないと主張することは成立不可能なパラドクスであろう。私ならばこのことを心的なるものと心的でないものものとの間の、最も重要な相違のひとつ と見なしたであろう(I should have regarded)。(しかし)私はこの地位を知能に与えないであろう。なぜなら、計算機(初期のコンピュータ)は、ある点において(ある意味で)、いかなる人間よりも知的であるからである。しかし、私は計算機(初期のコンピュータ)に票を与えるキャンペーンを支持する気にはならない。なぜなら、計算機は快あるいは不快を経験するとは、私は信じないからである。 |
Chapter 18,n.4: What is mind?, n.4Some difficulties in his denial of private data he does deal with, more or less. He has a whole chapter on imagination, but I entirely fail to understand how he can be satisfied by what he says. He says that operations of imagining are exercises of mental powers, but what we imagine exists nowhere. Let us examine this for a moment. In its obvious sense, it is, of course, a truism. If I shut my eyes and imagine a horse, there is no horse in the room. But it is one thing to imagine a horse and another to imagine a hippopotamus. Something happens when I imagine the one, and something else happens when I imagine the other. What can it be that is happening in these two cases? Professor Ryle states explicitly (page 16l) that there are no such things as mental happenings. Where perception is concerned, he contents himself with naive realism: I perceive a horse, and the horse is out there. It is not a 'mental' horse. But when I imagine a horse, it is not out there, and yet the occurrence is not the same as imagining a hippopotamus. I should have thought it as obvious as anything can be that something is happening in me and cannot be known to anybody else unless I do something overt to let it be known what it is that I am imagining.I should have thought that the same sort of thing might be said about pleasure and unpleasure ( Professor Ryle agrees with most psychologists in pointing out that 'pain' is not the opposite of 'pleasure'). A man may exhibit overt signs of pleasure, but it is quite possible for him to conceal pleasure, for example, if he hears of a misfortune to a man whom he hates but pretends to love. It is difficult to suppose that sticks and stones feel either pleasure or unpleasure, but it would be an impossible paradox to maintain that human beings do not. I should have regarded this as one of the most important differences between what is mental and what is not. I should not give this position to intelligence, because calculating machines are, in some ways, more intelligent than any human being. But I should not favour a campaign to give votes to calculating machines, because I do not believe that they experience either pleasure or unpleasure. |