第16章 「非論証的推論」n.3 - ケインズの確率論
けれども、ケインズ (L.M. Keynes) がその著 『確率論』 (Treatise on Probability) で採用したもうひとつの全くちがった理論がある。彼は、二つの命題の間には、一方の命題が他方の命題を、多かれ少なかれ、蓋然的ならしめるような関係(性)が存在しうると考えた。彼は、この関係は定義不可能であり、この関係には様々な程度があり、その程度の極端なものは、一方の命題が他方の命題の真理を確実ならしめる場合と、一方の命題が他方の命題の虚偽を確実ならしめる場合である。彼はあらゆる確率が数的に計測可能であるとか、また、理論上であってさえ、頻度に還元できるとは、信じることはできなかった。 |
Chapter 16: Non-Demonstrative Inference , n.3The theory which considers that all probability is of this statistical kind is called the 'frequency' theory. What, for example, is the probability that a person chosen at random from the population of England will be called 'Smith'? You find out how many people there are in England and how many of them are called 'Smith'. You then define the probability that a person chosen at random will be called 'Smith' as the ratio of the number of Smiths to the number of the total population. This is a perfectly precise mathematical conception, having nothing whatever to do with uncertainty. Uncertainty only comes in when you apply the conception as, for example, if you see a stranger across the street and you bet a hundred to one that he is not called 'Smith'. But so long as you do not apply the calculus of probability to empirical material, it is a perfectly straightforward branch of mathematics with all the exactness and certainty characteristic of mathematics.There is, however, another, quite different, theory which was adopted by Keynes in his Treatise on Probability. He held that there can be a relation between two propositions consisting in the fact that one of them makes the other probable in a greater or less degree. He held that this relation is indefinable and capable of varying degrees, the extreme degrees being when the one proposition makes the truth of the other certain, and when it makes its falsehood certain. He did not believe that all probabilities are numerically measurable or reducible, even in theory, to frequencies. |