第2章 私の現在の世界観 n.12 - 感覚→知覚→記憶--因果の線
上述の理論には3つの要点がある。第一は、数学的物理学(数理物理学)において現われる実体(entities)は、この世界の素材(stuff)の一部ではなく、事象から成るものでありかつ数学者が便宜上の単位として取り扱われる(ところの)論理的構成物である(ということである)。第二は、我々が推論なしに知覚するものの全ては我々の私的世界に属する(ということである)。この点に関しては、私はバークリ(の説に)に賛成する。(バークリーも言うように)視覚において我々知るところの星空は、我々の内部(注:脳内)にある。我々がその存在を信ずるところの外部の星空は推論された(推論によって得られる)ものである。第三は、我々に様々な対象(の存在)を気づかせる因果(原因-結果)の線は、いくらかはいたるところに存在するけれども、砂上を流れる川のように,次第に衰えて消えて行きがちである(ということである)。それが我々がいつも全てのものを知覚してはいないという理由である。 私は右(上述)の理論が証明できるふりをするつもりはない。私の力説したいことは、この理論は -物理学の諸理論と同様に- 反証(誤っているという証拠)をあげることができないものであり、以前の理論家たちが不可解と認めた多くの問題に答を与えるものであるということである。分別ある人ならば、いかなる理論に対しても、この理論以上であると主張するとは思わない(主張しないだろうと思う)。 |
Chapter 2: My present view of the world, n.12We can approach the same result by another route. When we were considering the photographic plate which photographs a portion of the starry heavens, we saw that this involves a great multiplicity of occurrences at the photographic plate: namely, at the very least, one for each object that it can photograph. I infer that, in every small region of space-time, there is an immense multiplicity of overlapping events each connected by a causal line to an origin at some earlier time - though, usually, at a very slightly earlier time. A sensitive instrument, such as a photographic plate, placed anywhere, may be said in a sense to 'perceive' the various objects from which these causal lines emanate. We do not use the word 'perceive' unless the instrument in question is a living brain, but that is because those regions which are inhabited by living brains have certain peculiar relations among the events occurring there. The most important of these is memory. Wherever these peculiar relations exist, we say that there is a percipient. We may define a 'mind' as a collection of events connected with each other by memory-chains backwards and forwards. We know about one such collection of events - namely, that constituting ourself - more intimately and directly than we know about anything else in the world. In regard to what happens to ourself, we know not only abstract logical structure, but also qualities - by which I mean what characterizes sounds as opposed to colours, or red as opposed to green. This is the sort of thing that we cannot know where the physical world is concerned.There are three key points in the above theory. The first is that the entities that occur in mathematical physics are not part of the stuff' of the world, but are constructions composed of events and taken as units for the convenience of the mathematician. The second is that the whole of what we perceive without inference belongs to our private world. In this respect, I agree with Berkeley. The starry heaven that we know in visual sensation is inside us. The external starry heaven that we believe in is inferred. The third point is that the causal lines which enable us to be aware of a diversity of objects, though there are some such lines everywhere, are apt to peter out like rivers in the sand. That is why we do not at all times perceive everything. I do not pretend that the above theory can be proved. What I contend is that, like the theories of physics, it cannot be disproved, and gives an answer to many problems which older theorists have found puzzling. I do not think that any prudent person will claim more than this for any theory. |