バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』10-10- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第10章:倫理学における権威 n.10 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 10: Authority in Ethics, n.10 | |||
AがBに「あなたはXをすべきだ」と言うとき、私は「~すべき」という言葉を、Bにとって可能な全ての行為の中で、Xが人類、あるいは全ての生きとし生けるものの利益を増進する可能性が最も高い行為である、と定義する。
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When A says to B, “you ought to do X”, I shall define the word “ought” as meaning that, of all acts that are possible for B, X is the one most likely to further the interests of mankind, or of all sentient beings. Although by the above method we have secured a measure of objectivity in our definition of “ought”, it should not be forgotten that, in a certain sense, the sanction of any morality is ultimately egoistic. A man's actions are partly reflex, partly habitual, and partly the result of desire. When I sneeze or yawn, I do not do so in the belief that this action furthers my interest. When I perform some purely habitual action, such as dressing, I may be quite unaware of what I am doing, and, in any case, am not deliberately choosing one course of action in preference to another, except when I am debating what clothes to wear. The moralist is not concerned with actions that are merely reflex or habitual, but with deliberate choices. Now when I make a choice, it is my desires that are operative. The desires of others are only effective in so far as they influence mine. To say that I shall act on my own desires, is to utter a tautology. When moralists tell us, as they are too apt to do, that we ought to resist desire for the sake of higher things, what they really mean is that we ought to subordinate some desires to others. The others, which the moralist wishes to see supreme, are of two sorts. There is first the wish to please and to earn praise from our friends or from the authorities, or, if we live in the Italian Renaissance, posterity. But there is also another kind of desire, which is that involved in love or sympathy, which is the straightforward uncomplicated desire for the welfare of others. Almost everybody feels this in some degree. It is abnormal not to feel it towards one's children while they are young. Either of these two classes of desire tends to harmonize my interests with those of others. I define my interests as all the things that I desire, and therefore, in so far as I desire the welfare of others, this becomes part of my interests. Although, therefore, what determines my action is what I desire, and is in this sense egoistic, it is not necessarily egoistic as regards the objects desired. |