バートランド・ラッセル『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954
* 原著:Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954* 邦訳書:バートランド・ラッセル(著),勝部真長・長谷川鑛平(共訳)『ヒューマン・ソサエティ-倫理学から政治学へ』(玉川大学出版部,1981年7月刊。268+x pp.)
『ヒューマン・ソサエティ』第6章:道徳的義務 n.13 |
Human Society in Ethics and Politics, 1954, chapter 6: Moral obligation, n.13 | |||
|
It would seem that the moral qualities which are most actively admired are courage and self-sacrifice on behalf of one’s own group. Some men admire these qualities wherever they occur; others only admire them when displayed by members of their own herd. The Inquisition did not admire the courage of the heretic martyrs whom it condemned, but regarded their stubbornness as inspired by the Devil. In war, some men admire bravery on the part of the enemy, others do not. There is a broad rule about praise, that it is bestowed upon those who have sacrificed their own interests (or what seemed such) to the interests of others. The desire for praise and the fear of blame may be so great that they outweigh all other considerations: "death rather than dishonour” is considered a desirable sentiment, but is not, strictly speaking, an unselfish one. The same sort of thing operates in less dramatic forms: if I were tempted to try to defraud a railway company by travelling without a ticket, the fear of disgrace in the event of discovery would be a far more powerful deterrent than the legal penalty. In this way praise and blame supplement the criminal law in causing individual interests to harmonize with those of the community. |