バートランド・ラッセル「経験主義の哲学」
* 原著：Unpopular Essays, 1950, chap. 1: Philosophy and Politics
* 出典：牧野力(編)『ラッセル思想辞典』索引
下記は牧野力氏による要旨訳（注：ただし、少し字句を修正）に原文を追加したものです。
民主主義を理論的に正当化する唯一の哲学は経験主義の哲学であり、・・・、この創始者（と考えて良い）J. ロックは、自由や寛容に関する見解と絶対君主制への反対とが如何に密接に結び付いているかを明らかにしている。それは、ヒュームの懐疑的意図から行われたのではなく、人間が誤りを犯すかも知れない可能性を誰にも気付かせようとする意図から行われている。いろいろな宗派の人々の熱狂や王権神授説という教義の双方が生む諸悪を見落さなかったのである。
商業は広義の自由主義的政治理論を生んだ。最初、小アジアのイオニア諸都市で、 ・・・次に、アテネでの商業の繁栄にその例を見る。長い暗黒時代の後で（After a long eclipse,）、自由主義思想は中世のロンバルディア諸都市に復活した。・・・十七世紀の自由主義の代表はオランダとイギリスだった。現代では米国がその例である。
商業と自由主義との結合には明白な理由がある。人々は交易によって種族的慣習の相違に触れ、独善的な考え方を自分から打破しない限り売り買いが成立しないことを悟ったからである。
帝国主義的交易は、相手に銃剣をちらつかせる押し売りだから、自由主義的哲学が生れるはずがない。自由主義哲学は軍事力を余り持たない交易都市に栄え、現代では古代・中世の商業都市に最も似ているスイス、オランダ、スカンジナビアの小国に見いだせる
経験主義的認識論を最初に詳細に展開したロックは 宗教的寛容と代議政体により、政府の権力を組織的に抑制し、市民のカと均衡させる必要を説いた。独裁制と革命の生む無秩序とを嫌い、権威主義を伴わぬ秩序を擁護した。
倫理的な理由からも経験主義は推奨される。
教条主義は意見を抱く上で知的思考よりも権威にたより、説得よりも異端者への迫害と不信仰者への敵意とを必要とする。憎悪を組織化し教条主義に固執すれば、 戦争と成る。現代科学の時代では早晩、 全世界の死を招く。 ロックの時代と同じように、現代においても、民主主義的社会主義と矛盾しない経験主義的自由主義こそが 一方で、信念に科学的根拠を与え、 他方で、党派的信条の流行よりも、人類の平和と幸福を願う人々が採用するのに相応しい唯一の哲学である。
左右両翼の教条主義から解放されて、自由、寛容の実践などの価値を深く確信しない限り、技術的には平和を実現する条件が出揃っているのに、政治的に分裂している地上での人類存続は不可能である。
( The only philosophy that affords a theoretical justification of democracy, and that accords with democracy in its temper of mind, is empiricism. Locke, who may be regarded, so far as the modern world is concerned, as the founder of empiricism, makes it clear how closely this is connected with his views on liberty and toleration, and with his opposition to absolute monarchy. He is never tired of emphasising the uncertainty of most of our knowledge, not with a sceptical intention such as Hume's, but with the intention of making men aware that they may be mistaken, and that they should take account of this possibility in all their dealings with men of opinions different from their own. He had seen the evils wrought, both by the 'enthusiasm' of the sectaries, and by the dogma of divine right of kings; to both he opposed a piecemeal and patchwork political doctrine, to be tested at each point by its success in practice.
What may be called, in a broad sense, the Liberal theory of politics is a recurrent product of commerce. The first known example of it was in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, which lived by trading with Egypt and Lydia. When Athens, in the time of Pericles, became commercial, the Athenians became Liberal. After a long eclipse, Liberal ideas revived in the Lombard cities of the middle ages, and prevailed in Italy until they were extinguished by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. But the Spaniards failed to reconquer Holland or to subdue England, and it was these countries that were the champions of Liberalism and the leaders in commerce in the seventeenth century. In our day the leadership has passed to the United States.
The reasons for the connection of commerce with Liberalism are obvious. Trade brings men into contact with tribal customs different from their own, and in so doing destroys the dogmatism of the untravelled. The relation of buyer and seller is one of negotiation between two parties who are both free; it is most profitable when the buyer or seller is able to understand the point of view of the other party. There is, of course, imperialistic commerce, where men are forced to buy at the point of the sword; but this is not the kind that generates Liberal philosophies, which have flourished best in trading cities that have wealth without much military strength. In the present day, the nearest analogue to the commercial cities of antiquity and the middle ages is to be found in small countries such as Switzerland, Holland, and Scandinavia.
The Liberal creed, in practice, is one of live-and-let-live, of toleration and freedom so far as public order permits, of moderation and absence of fanaticism in political programmes. Even democracy, when it becomes fanatical, as it did among Rousseau's disciples in the French Revolution, ceases to be Liberal; indeed, a fanatical belief in democracy makes democratic institutions impossible, as appeared in England under Cromwell and in France under Robespierre. The genuine Liberal does not say 'this is true', he says I am inclined to think that under present circumstances this opinion is probably the best.' And it is only in this limited and undogmatic sense that he will advocate democracy.
What has theoretical philosophy to say that is relevant to the validity or otherwise of the Liberal outlook?
The essence of the Liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held, but in how they are held: instead of being held dogmatically, they are held tentatively, and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment. This is the way in which opinions are held in science, as opposed to the way in which they are held in theology. The decisions of the Council of Nicaea are still authoritative, but in science fourth-century opinions no longer carry any weight. In the USSR the dicta of Marx on dialectical materialism are so unquestioned that they help to determine the views of geneticists on how to obtain the best breed of wheat, though elsewhere it is thought that experiment is the right way to study such problems. Science is empirical, tentative, and undogmatic; all immutable dogma is unscientific. The scientific outlook, accordingly, is the intellectual counterpart of what is, in the practical sphere, the outlook of Liberalism.
Locke, who first developed in detail the empiricist theory of knowledge, preached also religious toleration, representative institutions, and the limitation of governmental power by the system of checks and balances. Few of his doctrines were new, but he developed them in a weighty manner at just the moment when the English government was prepared to accept them. Like the other men of 1688, he was only reluctantly a rebel, and he disliked anarchy as much as he disliked despotism. Both in intellectual and practical matters he stood for order without authority; this might be taken as the motto both of science and of Liberalism. It depends, clearly, upon consent or assent. In the intellectual world it involves standards of evidence which, after adequate discussion, will lead to a measure of agreement among experts. In the practical world it involves submission to the majority after all parties have had an opportunity to state their case.
In both respects his moment was a fortunate one. The great controversy between the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems had been decided, and scientific questions could no longer be settled by an appeal to Aristotle. Newton's triumphs seemed to justify boundless scientific optimism.
In the practical world, a century and a half of wars of religion had produced hardly any change in the balance of power as between Protestants and Catholics. Enlightened men had begun to view theological controversies as an absurdity, caricatured in Swift's war between the Big-endians and the Little-endians. The extreme Protestant sects, by relying upon the inner light, had made what professed to be Revelation into an anarchic force. Delightful enterprises, scientific and commercial, invited energetic men to turn aside from barren disputation. Fortunately they accepted the invitation, and two centuries of unexampled progress resulted.
We are now again in an epoch of wars of religion, but a religion is now called an 'ideology'. At the moment, the Liberal philosophy is felt by many to be too tame and middle-aged: ...
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Empiricism, finally, is to be commended not only on the ground of its greater truth, but also on ethical grounds. Dogma demands authority, rather than intelligent thought, as the source of opinion; it requires persecution of heretics and hostility to unbelievers; it asks of its disciples that they should inhibit natural kindliness in favour of systematic hatred. Since argument is not recognised as a means of arriving at truth, adherents of rival dogmas have no method except war by means of which to reach a decision. And war, in our scientific age, means, sooner or later, universal death.
I conclude that, in our day as in the time of Locke, empiricist Liberalism (which is not incompatible with democratic socialism) is the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who, on the one hand, demands some scientific evidence for his beliefs, and, on the other hand, desires human happiness more than the prevalence of this or that party or creed. Our confused and difficult world needs various things if it is to escape disaster, and among these one of the most necessary is that, in the nations which still uphold Liberal beliefs, these beliefs should be wholehearted and profound, not apologetic towards dogmatisms of the right and of the left, but deeply persuaded of the value of liberty, scientific freedom, and mutual forbearance. For without these beliefs life on our politically divided but technically unified planet will hardly continue to be possible.
