The value of philosophy is, in fact,to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions,and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find,as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises,is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are,it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt,and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect. (From: The Problems of Philosophy, 1912)
... In philosophy, hitherto, ethical neutrality has been seldom sought and hardly ever achieved. Men have remembered their wishes, and have judged philosophies in relation to their wishes. Driven from the particular sciences, the belief that the notions of good and evil must afford a key to the understanding of the world has sought a refuge in philosophy. But even from this last refuge, if philosophy is not to remain a set of pleasing dreams, this belief must be driven forth.
It is a commonplace that happiness is not best achieved by those who seek it directly; and it would seem that the same is true of the good. In thought, at any rate, those who forget good and evil and seek only to know the facts are more likely to achieve good than those who view the world through the distorting medium of their own desires.
(From: Our Knowledge of the External World, 1914, chap. 1)
経験世界を構成する素材
・我々の経験の世界を構成する素材とは,私の信じるところでは,心でも物質でもなく,そのどちらよりも原始的なものである。心も物質も構成されたものであるように思われる。(From: The Analysis of Mind, 1921.)